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In many environments expertise is costly. Costs can manifest themselves in numerous ways,
ranging from the time that is required for a nancial consultant to study companies' performances,
to the resources necessary for academic referees to produce knowledgeable reports, to the attention
and thought needed for jurors to construct informed convictions. The current paper asks a natural
question germane to such contexts: how should a committee of potential experts be designed, in
terms of the number of participants, their a-priori preferences, as well as the rules by which their
recommendations are aggregated into a collective policy?
We consider a model in which a principal makes a binary decision (e.g., continue or abort a
project), the value of which depends on the realization of some underlying state that is unknown
(say, whether the project is great or inferior). The principal can hire a committee of experts from
a pool varying in their preferences. All experts have access to an information technology providing
(public) information regarding the underlying state. Information comes at a private cost to the
experts, who care both about the nal decision the principal takes, as well as about the amount they
had personally spent on information acquisition.
Concentrating on small committees comprised of up to two potential experts, we provide several
layers of responses to our fundamental design question, varying in the exibility of the available
contracts. First, we study institutions in which agents make their decisions regarding information
acquisition simultaneously and characterize the optimal way to organize committees consisting of
either one or two agents.
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Next, we consider the full array of sequential mechanisms. We characterize the optimal sequential
mechanism and identify the type of contract as well as the preferences of experts that are optimal
across all classes of institutions (simultaneous or sequential). Namely, for a large class of cost
functions, principals are divided into two types. For suciently moderate principals, a sequential
mechanism with two identical experts who have opposing prior inclinations to the principal, and are
more extreme, is optimal. For all other principals, none of the mechanisms are incentive compatible,
and such principals are best o using no experts and following their ex-ante inclination.
Underlying the solution to our design problem (and any of its forms) are two trade-os. First,
for any expert preferences, there is a trade-o between the need to induce participants to acquire
expertise on the one hand, and the desire to fully utilize this expertise on the other hand. Second,
when choosing experts' preferences, there is a trade-o between choosing agents with similar prefer-
ences to the principal's in order to make revealing accurate information more valuable to the experts.
On the other hand, choosing experts with more extreme preferences makes mistakes more costly for
them and therefore induces more information acquisition as well.
In resolving the rst trade-o, the optimal mechanism entails the use of at most two agents in a
sequential mechanism, one in which two signals are collected only some of the time. In resolving the
second trade-o, the optimal mechanism consists of agents who have opposing and more extreme
preferences than the principal.
The analysis is useful in its applicability to institutional design in a wide range of environments,
practically any in which information (that is later to be aggregated) is not fully exogenous. It is also
important in eliciting the crucial dierences between the optimal organizational designs that arise
under these dierent plausible institutional structures.
The paper contributes to the recently growing literature on collective choice with endogenous
information, including work by Calvert [1985], Li [2001], Cai [2003], Persico [2004], Dur and Swank
[2005], Smorodinsky and Tennenholtz [2005], Gerardi and Yariv [2007a,b,c], Che and Kartik [2007],
and Gershkov and Szentes [2008]. Our innovation is in the provision of a simple model allowing for
the characterization of the optimal general mechanism entailing the committee's size and preference
composition, as well as the rule by which the principal aggregates information (static or dynamic).
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I. The Model
There is a principal and a large population of experts who apply for two positions. All experts
have the same ability but dierent preferences. The goal of the principal is to select the optimal
mechanism and the optimal pair of experts. Our setup is reminiscent of the standard jury model
(see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996 or Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998).
We focus on the case in which the two states, I and G (a metaphor for a project that is either
inferior or great), are equally likely: r  Pr (G) = 1=2.
Information is costly. An expert j can acquire a signal of quality pj 2 [1=2; 1] : The signal is binary,
sj = i; g. The probability distribution of a signal sj of quality pj is Pr (sj = ijI) = Pr (sj = gjG) = pj :
If more than one expert purchases information, we assume their signals are conditionally independent.
Let j = 1; 2 and x a signal of quality pj : Suppose that the realization of the signal is sj =
i; g: We let Pr (!jsj ; pj) denote the probability that the state is ! = I;G given pj and sj : Then,
Pr (Iji; pj) = Pr (Gjg; pj) = pj : We also let Pr (!js1; s2; p1; p2) denote the probability that the state
is ! = I;G given p1; p2; s1 and s2:
The cost of acquiring a signal of quality p is c (p) : The cost function c : [1=2; 1] ! R+ satises
the following properties:
 c0

1
2
+

= 0 (c0

1
2
+

is the right derivative of c at p = 1=2);
 c0 (1 ) > 1 (c0 (1 ) is the left derivative of c at p = 1);
 c00 (p) > 0 and c000 (p) > 0 for every p 2 [1=2; 1] (i.e., the marginal cost c0 is increasing and
convex).
We introduce an additional condition on c:
Condition 1. There exist two numbers,  and  in [0; 1]2 ; such that c0

+
2

> 1=2 and
c0 () = ; c0 () =

2
: (1)
Notice that under our assumptions on the function c; the system (1) always admits a unique
solution (; ) 2 [0; 1]2 : Thus, condition (1) imposes a restriction on the value of the cost function
c at the midpoint of the solutions to the system (1).
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Condition (1) is satised if the marginal cost c0 has \enough curvature." For example, suppose
that
c0 (p) =
p  1=2
k (1  p)
where k > 0: Then condition (1) is satised for k suciently large.
The signals are public but the eort of the experts is not observable.
There are two decisions the principal can take: A or C (a metaphor for aborting or continuing
the project). The principal's threshold of reasonable doubt is qP and for each q 2 [0; 1] there are at
least two experts with threshold q (i.e., the principal can hire any pair of experts). We normalize
the utility of the optimal decision to zero and set u (A;G; q) =   (1  q) and u (C; I; q) =  q:
The case qp = r = 1=2 is special in the sense that adding a signal of quality p to an existing
signal of the same quality p does not increase the principal's expected payo. Thus we assume that
qP 6= r: In particular, we focus on the case qP > r = 1=2 (the principal cares more about the mistake
of continuing an inferior project). Clearly, the optimal uninformed decision is A:
We assume that the principal does not have the ability to commit. In particular, given the
available information, the principal chooses the action that maximizes her expected payo. Because
of this, we can restrict attention to the following mechanisms.
Mechanism with One Expert The principal hires one expert. The principal follows the
expert's signal. That is, the principal chooses A when the signal is i and C when the signal is g:
Simultaneous Mechanism The two experts acquire their signals simultaneously (i.e., an expert
does not observe the realization of the signal of the other expert).
Sequential Mechanisms The relevant sequential mechanisms to consider are the following:
 Class SiA If the signal of the rst expert is i the principal chooses A without consulting the
second expert. If the rst signal is g the principal continues and follows the advice of expert 2:
 Class SgC If the signal of the rst expert is g the principal chooses C without consulting the
second expert. If the rst signal is i the principal continues and follows the advice of expert 2:
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 Class SgA If the signal of the rst expert is g the principal chooses A without consulting the
second expert. If the rst signal is i the principal continues and follows the advice of expert 2:
 Class S2 The principal always asks the second expert to invest and follows his signal.
Of course, the mechanism has to be incentive compatible. That is, given the available information
(and the equilibrium strategies of the experts) it is optimal for the principal to follow the action
prescribed by the mechanism.1 Our goal is to nd the optimal mechanism and the optimal pair of
experts. We evaluate the mechanism from the point of view of the principal. In particular, we do
not take into account the experts' cost of acquiring information.
In principal, we should also consider mechanisms in which the principal randomizes at the action
stage. These mechanisms are incentive compatible only if the principal is indierent (i.e., her belief
that the state is G is equal to qP ). It is tedious but simple to show that random mechanisms are not
optimal. Intuitively, adding randomness to a mechanism decreases the probability that the experts'
signals are pivotal. This, in turn, lowers the incentives of the experts to acquire information.2
Under our assumptions we are able to characterize the optimal mechanism.
Proposition (Optimal Generalized Mechanisms) Whenever the cost function c satises Con-
dition (1), there exists a threshold level qP 2  12 ; 1 such that:
(i) If qP 6 qP ; then mechanism of class SiA with experts q1 = q2 = 0 is optimal;
(ii) If qP > qP ; then no mechanism is incentive compatible. The principal will make the optimal
uninformed decision A:
1For the sake of brevity, we do not consider mechanisms that would violate incentive compatibility directly. For
example, consider the following mechanism. If the signal of the rst expert is i the principal chooses C without
consulting the second expert. If the rst signal is g the principal continues and follows the advice of expert 2: The
mechanism is not incentive compatible because it is not optimal for the principal to choose C after observing the signal
i (recall that qP > r).
2In principle, there is another form of randomness. A principal could choose a mechanism in which she randomly
decides whether to consult a second expert or not. However, such mechanisms are not credible. Recall that the principal
has no commitment power. If the second expert acquires information, the principal has a strict incentive to hire him.
Note that in the mechanisms of class SiA; SgC ; and SgA the principal does not have an incentive to consult the second
expert when she is not supposed to. Indeed, it is enough to assume the following Nash equilibrium o-path behavior:
the second expert does not acquire information and the principal does not react to any information collected.
Costly Expertise 6
We provide the proof of the Proposition in the remaining sections, illustrating the optimal mech-
anism within each class on the way.3
II. One Expert
Consider a mechanism with one expert who has a threshold equal to q: If the principal has very
extreme preferences, no individual expert can sway her prior inclinations, and she is best o choosing
A regardless of the expert's reports. In any other case, any expert would be useful, as the following
claim illustrates.
Claim 1 (Optimal Mechanism with One Expert) If qP 6 (c0) 1 (12); then any expert is op-
timal and the accuracy acquired is (c0) 1 (12): If q
P > (c0) 1 (12); then it is optimal for the
principal to hire no expert and choose the action A (or hire an expert and disregard their
advice, which in equilibrium will be uninformative).
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose that the principal follows the expert's signal. The expert's expected
payo if he chooses a signal of quality p is equal to
 r (1  q) (1  p)  (1  r) q (1  p)  c (p) =  1
2
(1  p)  c (p)
Notice that the expert's payo does not depend on his threshold (since r = 1=2). Of course, the
expert will choose the level of eort p0 such that c
0 (p0) = 12 : The mechanism is incentive compatible
if and only if p0 = Pr (Gjg; p0) > qP ; and the result follows. 
Note that in much the same way, it is easy to see that if r > 1=2 (r < 1=2) then it is optimal to
hire an expert with q = 0 (q = 1).
II. Simultaneous Mechanism
When two agents are employed, inducing both to acquire information is again contingent on the
principal not being too extreme in her initial inclinations. In that case, their ideal preferences are
more extreme than the principal's, as the following claim illustrates.
3A detailed proof appears in a working paper version, Gerardi and Yariv [2007c].
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Claim 2 (Optimal Simultaneous Mechanism) There is an incentive compatible mechanism with
two agents acquiring information if and only if qP 6 Pr (Gjg; g; ~p; ~p) ; where 12 ~p = c0 (~p) : In
that case, the optimal committee consists of two experts with q = 0; who acquire signal accuracy
~p.
Proof of Claim 2. Without loss of generality we assume that in equilibrium expert 1 exerts more
eort than expert 2, i.e., p1 > p2 > 1=2 (referred to as the (EQ) condition): The principal must
choose A after (i; i) and (i; g) : Also, she must choose C after (g; g) : Otherwise, she would always
choose A and the experts would not invest. Finally, the principal must choose A after (g; i). If not,
then she would simply follow the advice of expert 1 and p2 > 1=2 would not be optimal for expert 2:
So we look for equilibria in which p1 > p2 > 1=2 and the principal chooses C if and only if the
signal prole is (g; g) :
If p1; p2 are equilibrium eorts they have to satisfy:
p1 = argmaxp01  12 (1  q1) [1  p01p2]  12q1 [(1  p01) (1  p2)]  c (p01) and
p2 = argmaxp02  12 (1  q2) [1  p1p02]  12q2 [(1  p1) (1  p02)]  c (p02) :
Combining the corresponding FOC's with the principal's IC constraints Pr (Gjg; i; p1; p2) 6 qP
and Pr (Gjg; g; p1; p2) > qP ; we get the principal's problem to be:
max
q1;q2;p1;p2
 1
2
 
1  qP  [1  p1p2]  1
2
qP [(1  p1) (1  p2)]
subject to the following constraints
(FOC) 12 (1  q1) p2 + 12q1 (1  p2) = c0 (p1) and 12 (1  q2) p1 + 12q2 (1  p1) = c0 (p2)
(IC) p1(1 p2)p1(1 p2)+(1 p1)p2 6 q
P and p1p2p1p2+(1 p1)(1 p2) > q
P
(EQ) p1 > p2 > 1=2
Let j = 1; 2 and k = 3 j denote the pair of experts. We dene the function Fj (qj ; pk) as follows:
Fj (qj ; pk) =
 
c0
 11
2
(1  qj) pk + 1
2
qj (1  pk)

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and notice that
@Fj (qj ; pk)
@qj
=
1
2   pk
c00 (Fj (qj ; pk))
< 0 and
@Fj (qj ; pk)
@pk
=
1
2   qj
c00 (Fj (qj ; pk))
Suppose that both experts have q = 0: The function Fj (0; pk) is increasing, c
0  Fj  0; 12 = r2 = 14 ;
and c0 (Fj (0; 1)) = r = 12 : This implies that the functions F1 (0; ) and F2 (0; ) intersect (once
because Fj (0; ) is concave). Moreover, if (p1; p2) 6= (F1 (0; p2) ; F2 (0; p1)) is such that p1 6 F1 (0; p2)
and p2 6 F2 (0; p1) ; then there exists a pair (p01; p02) such that for every j = 1; 2; p0j > pj and
p0j = Fj (0; p
0
k) :
Consider a pair (q1; q2) 6= (0; 0) and the corresponding equilibrium eorts (p1; p2) with pj =
(Fj (qj ; pk)) : Notice that Fj (qj ; pk) < Fj (0; pk) if qj > 0 since Fj is decreasing in qj : But then
(p1; p2) 6= (F1 (0; p2) ; F2 (0; p1)) and p1 6 F1 (0; p2), p2 6 F2 (0; p1) : We conclude that there exists
(p01; p02) = (F1 (0; p02) ; F2 (0; p01)) with p0j > pj for every j: The principal's utility is increasing in p1
and p2 and, thus, the pair of experts (0; 0) is optimal.
Consider now the FOC's for two experts with q = 0 : 12p2 = c
0 (p1) and 12p1 = c
0 (p2) ; which implies
1
2p2 + c
0 (p2) = 12p1 + c
0 (p1) : Obviously, the solution must be symmetric: p1 = p2 = ~p satisfying
1
2 ~p = c
0 (~p) : Since the eort is symmetric, Pr (Gjg; i; ~p; ~p) = 12 < qP and the claim follows. 
In the next section we show that if there exists an incentive compatible simultaneous mechanism
then there is also an incentive compatible sequential mechanism of class SiA which yields the principal
a higher utility.
III. Sequential Mechanisms
We start with a heuristic comparison between the dierent sequential mechanisms. First, it is
easy to check that in a mechanism of class SgA expert 1 does not acquire information. This is
intuitive since the principal will either go against expert 1's signal, or ignore his advice altogether.
Furthermore, note that from the structure of the problem, SiA can be implemented with experts
of preferences (q1; q2) investing in information of accuracies (p1; p2) if and only if SgC can be imple-
mented with the same accuracies (p1; p2) when choosing experts with preferences (1   q1; 1   q2):
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Given that the principal is inclined toward a choice of A; upon choosing a sequential mechanism,
it is sensible for her to pursue more information when preliminary evidence goes against her prior
inclinations. That is, SiA generates greater expected payos than SgC :
Comparing between the mechanism S2 and SiA requires more subtle arguments. Indeed, when
S2 is implemented, the second expert in line conditions his level of investment on the signal reported
by the rst expert (otherwise, the rst expert does not invest in information and we are back to
the single expert case). Suppose that the second expert invests dierential amounts depending on
the rst expert's signal realization: The accuracy acquired by the second agent is a random variable,
with a distribution determined by the investment of the rst expert. For suciently convex cost
functions, the average accuracy is far lower than in SiA; and generates a lower expected payo. In
fact, Condition (1) assures that this is indeed the case.
The above arguments can be formalized in a straightforward manner and their details appear in
Gerardi and Yariv [2007c]. In what follows, we characterize the optimal committee when SiA is im-
plemented and illustrate its superiority over the single agent as well as the simultaneous mechanism,
thereby providing a proof for the Proposition.
Consider then the sequential mechanism SiA and let p1 and p2 denote the eort of the two experts.
If expert 1 observes signal g; then expert 2 assigns probability p1 = Pr (Gjg; p1) to state G:
The principal's utility is equal to
 1
2
 
1  qP  (1  p1p2)  1
2
qP (1  p1) (1  p2)
and is increasing in p1 and p2:
The utility of expert 1 is equal to  12 (1  q1) (1  p1p2)  12q1 (1  p1) (1  p2) c (p1) with FOC
1
2 (1  q1) p2 + 12q1 (1  p2)  c0 (p1) = 0:
Recall that the function F1 (q1; p2) is dened as follows:
F1 (q1; p2) =
 
c0
 11
2
(1  q1) p2 + 1
2
q1 (1  p2)

The utility of expert 2 is equal to   [p1 (1  q2) + (1  p1) q2] (1  p2)   c (p2) with FOC
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p1 (1  q2) + (1  p1) q2   c0 (p2) = 0.
Let the function G2 (q2; p1) be dened by
G2 (q2; p1) =
 
c0
 1
(p1 (1  q2) + (1  p1) q2)
and notice that
@G2 (q2; p1)
@q2
=
1  2p1
c00 (G2 (q2; p1))
< 0 and
@G2 (q2; p1)
@p1
=
(1  2q2)
c00 (G2 (q2; p1))
:
Consider the function G2 (0; p1) = (c
0) 1 (p1) : It is increasing, c0
 
G2
 
0; 12

= r = 12 ; and
c0 (G2 (0; 1)) = 1:
This together with the properties of F1 (0; p2) (see proof of Claim 2) imply the following. The
functions F1 (0; ) and G2 (0; ) intersect once. Moreover, if (p1; p2) 6= (F1 (0; p2) ; G2 (0; p1)) is such
that p1 6 F1 (0; p2) and p2 6 G2 (0; p1) ; then there exists a pair (p01; p02) = (F1 (0; p02) ; G2 (0; p01))
with p0j > pj for every j = 1; 2:
We now show that the optimal pair of experts in a mechanism of class 1 is q1 = q2 = 0:
Consider the pair (q1; q2) 6= (0; 0) with eort levels (p1; p2) : Notice that
p1 = F1 (q1; p2) 6 F1 (0; p2) and p2 = G2 (q2; p1) 6 G2 (0; p1)
and at least one inequality is strict. Thus, there exist eort levels (p01; p02) for the pair of experts
(0; 0) with p0j > pj ; for every j:
Let (p^1; p^2) be the eort levels of the optimal pair of experts. They are dened by:
1
2
p^2 = c
0 (p^1) and p^1 = c0 (p^2) : (2)
Notice that under our assumptions (c convex, c0(1=2) = 0; c0 (1) > 1) the system of equations (2)
always admits a unique solution 1=2 < p^1 < p^2 < 1.
Of course, we need to check that Pr (Gjg; g; p^1; p^2) > qP ; otherwise the principal will not choose C
after receiving reports (g; g) (it is straightforward to see that all the other constraints are satised).
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Comparison between Simultaneous Mechanisms and SiA Mechanisms
Suppose that there exists an incentive compatible simultaneous mechanism (with q1 = q2 = 0)
with symmetric eort level ~p dened in Claim 2. Then it is easy to see that there is also an incentive
compatible sequential mechanism of type SiA (with q1 = q2 = 0) with eort levels p^1 > ~p and
p^2 > ~p: Recall also that in the optimal simultaneous mechanism the principal chooses C if and only
if both experts observe g: We conclude that the optimal mechanism of type SiA dominates the best
simultaneous mechanism with two experts.4
Comparison between One Expert Mechanisms and SiA Mechanisms
Suppose that there exists an incentive compatible mechanism with one expert with eort level
p0 (dened in Claim 1). Then there also exists an incentive compatible mechanism of type SiA
(with q1 = q2 = 0) with eort levels p^1 and p^2: It follows from the denition of p0 and the FOC's
corresponding to SiA that p^2 > p0 > p^1:
Let U (p^1; p^2) denote the principal's expected payo under the mechanism of class SiA. Similarly,
let U (p0) denote the principal's payo under the mechanism with one expert. We have
U (p^1; p^2) =  12
 
1  qP  (1  p^1p^2)  12qP (1  p^1) (1  p^2) ;
U (p0) =  12
 
1  qP  (1  p0)  12qP (1  p0) : (3)
After algebraic manipulations, the payo dierence between the two mechanisms is equal to
U (p^1; p^2)  U (p0) =  12
 
1  qP  (p0   p^1p^2) + 12qP (p^1 + p^2   p^1p^2   p0) >
>  12
 
1  qP  (p0   p^1p^2) + 12  1  qP  (p^1 + p^2   p^1p^2   p0) = 12  1  qP  (p^1 + p^2   2p0) ;
where the inequality follows from the fact that (p^1 + p^2   p^1p^2   p0) > 0 and qP > 1  qP :
Notice that (p^1; p^2) are the solution to the system of equations (2). It follows from Condition (1)
and the denition of p0 that
c0

p^1 + p^2
2

>
1
2
= c0 (p0)
Recall that c0 is strictly increasing. Thus, p^1+p^22 > p0: In particular, U (p^1; p^2) > U (p0) as needed.
4Note that this comparison relies only on the assumption that the cost function c is convex, and does not require
Condition (1).
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